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Abstract Recently, a chaotic image encryption algo-
rithm based on perceptron model was proposed. The
present paper analyzes security of the algorithm and
finds that the equivalent secret key can be reconstructed
with only one pair of known-plaintext/ciphertext, which
is supported by both mathematical proof and experi-
ment results. In addition, some other security defects
are also reported.
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1 Introduction
The usage of chaos for image encryption has been re-
ceived intensive attention in the past decade. This is
mainly spurred by the following three points: 1) in-
creasing importance of security of image data as it is
transmitted over all kinds of networks with a more and
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more higher frequency; 2) low efficiency of the tradi-
tional text encryption algorithms like DES with respect
to protecting image data due to some intrinsic features
of images such as bulk data capacity, high redundancy,
strong correlation among adjacent pixels, etc; 3) some
fundamental features of the chaotic dynamical systems
such as ergodicity, mixing property, sensitivity to initial
conditions/system parameter can be considered anal-
ogous to some ideal cryptographic properties such as
confusion, diffusion, avalanche properties. According to
the record of Web of Science, more than five hundreds
of articles on chaos-based image encryption algorithms
have been published in the past fifteen years [3]. Some
other related papers consider video, audio (speech) or
text as encryption objects [4, 5, 17].
Roughly speaking, the usage of chaos in designing
digital symmetric encryption algorithms can be catego-
rized as three classes: 1) creating position permutation
relations directly or indirectly; 2) generating pseudo-
random bit sequence (PRBS) controlling composition
and combination of some basic encryption operations;
3) producing ciphertext directly by assigning plaintext
as initial conditions or control parameters of a chaos
system. As native opposite of cryptography, some crypt-
analysis work was also developed and some chaos-based
encryption algorithms are found to be not secure of
different extents from the viewpoint of modern cryptol-
ogy [1,2,8,15,18,20]. Due to owning complex dynamical
properties, artificial neural network was combined with
chaos to design symmetric and public encryption algo-
rithms [6,7,13,14,21]. Unfortunately, some of them are
found to be equivalent to much simper form in terms
of essential structure and can be broken easily [10, 11].
In [19], a chaotic image encryption algorithm based
on perceptron model, a type of artificial neural network
invented in 1957, was proposed, where two PRBSs, gen-
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erated from quantized orbit of Lorenz system under
given secret key, is used to control the perceptron model
to output cipher-image from the input of plain-image.
However, we proved that the seeming complex image
encryption algorithm is equivalent to a stream cipher
of exclusive or (XOR) operation. So, it can be easily
broken with only one pair of plain-image and cipher-
image. In addition, some other security defects about
secret key, insensitive of cipher-image with respect to
plain-image and low randomness of the used PRBS are
reported.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section briefly introduces the proposed image en-
cryption algorithm. Section 3 presents detailed crypt-
analysis on the encryption algorithm with experiment
results and some other security defects. The last section
concludes the paper.
2 The proposed image encryption algorithm
The plaintext encrypted by the image encryption algo-
rithm under study is a gray-scale digital image. With-
out loss of generality, the plaintext can be represented
as a one-dimensional 8-bit integer sequences P = {pn}
N−1
n=0
by scanning it in a raster order. Correspondingly, the
ciphertext is denoted by P ′ = {p′n}
N−1
n=0 . The kernel of
the encryption algorithm is based on a threshold func-
tion
f(x) =
{
1, if x ≥ 0,
0, otherwise,
which was considered by the proposers as simple vari-
ant of a single layer perceptron model who inputs m
variables, s0, s1, · · · , sm−1, and outputs m ones by cal-
culating
g(si) =
1, if
(
m−1∑
j=0
siwij − θi
)
≥ 0,
0, otherwise,
where wij denotes the weight of the i-th input for the
j-th neuron, θi is the threshold of the i-th neuron, and
i = 0 ∼ m − 1. With these preliminary introduction,
the image encryption algorithm under study can be de-
scribed as follows1.
– The secret key: initial state (x∗0, y
∗
0 , z
∗
0) and the step
length h of an approximation method solving the
1 To make the presentation more concise and complete,
some notations in the original paper [19] are modified, and
some details about the algorithm are also amended under the
condition that its security property is not influenced.
Lorenz system
x˙ = ay − ax,
y˙ = cx− xz − y,
z˙ = xy − bz,
(1)
under fixed control parameters (a, b, c) = (10, 8
3
, 28).
– The initialization procedures :
1) in double-precision floating-point arithmetic, solve
the Lorenz system (1) with the fourth-order Runge-
Kutta method of step h iteratively 3001 times from
(x∗0, y
∗
0 , z
∗
0) and obtain the current approximation
state (x0, y0, z0) .
2) run the above solution approximation step seven
more times from the current approximation state to
get {(xj , yj, zj)}
7
j=1, and set
wj =
{
1, if (xj − xˇ)/(xˆ− xˇ) ≥ 0.5,
−1, otherwise,
and
w˜j =
{
1, if (yj − yˇ)/(yˆ − yˇ) ≥ 0.5,
−1, otherwise,
for j = 0 ∼ 7, where xˆ = max({xj}
7
j=0), xˇ =
min({xj}
7
j=0), yˆ = max({yj}
7
j=0), yˇ = min({yj}
7
j=0).
3) reset the current approximation state of the Lorenz
system as
x0 = xˇ+ (x8 − xˇ)
(
7∑
j=0
(wj + 1) · 2
j−1 ⊕ r
)
/256,
y0 = yˇ + (y8 − yˇ)
(
7∑
j=0
(w˜j + 1) · 2
j−1 ⊕ r
)
/256,
z0 = z8,
where r = ⌊(z8 − ⌊z8⌋) · 256⌋.
4) repeat the above two steps N − 1 times and get
two sequences {wk}
8N−1
k=0 and {w˜k}
8N−1
k=0 .
– The encryption procedure: for the n-th plain-byte
pn =
∑7
i=0 pn,i ·2
i, obtain the corresponding cipher-
byte p′n =
∑7
i=0 p
′
n,i · 2
i by calculating
p′n,i =
{
f(pn,iwk + ckw˜k − θk), if wk = 1,
f(pn,iwk − ckw˜k + θk), otherwise,
(2)
where ck = −wk/2, θk = ((wk+1)/2)⊕((w˜k+1)/2)
and k = 8 · n+ i.
– The decryption procedure is the same as the encryp-
tion one except that the locations of pn,i and p
′
n,i in
the encryption function (2) are swapped.
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3 Cryptanalysis
3.1 Known-plaintext attack
It is well-known that any detail of an encryption al-
gorithm, except the secret key, should be public. This
is called Kerckhoffs’s principle, which was reformulated
by Claude Shannon as Shannon’s maxim, “The enemy
knows the algorithm.” Under this principle, the known-
plaintext attack is a cryptanalysis model where the at-
tacker can access some samples of both the plaintext,
and the corresponding ciphertext (encrypted version).
The objective of the model is to reveal some (even all)
information about the secret key, which is then used
to decrypt other ciphertext encrypted with the same
secret key. Note that feasibility of the known-plaintext
attack is based on repeated usage of secret key, namely
impracticability of one-time pad, which is caused by
the following three problems: 1) impossibility of soft-
ware source of perfectly random bits; 2) secure gen-
eration and exchange of the one-time pad material of
not shorter length than that of the plaintext; 3) com-
plex secret key management preventing the secret key
is reused in whole or part.
Strength of any encryption algorithm against the
known-plaintext attack is one of the most important
factors evaluating its security. Unfortunately, we found
that the image encryption algorithm under study can
be broken with only one pair of plaintext and the cor-
responding ciphertext.
Theorem 1 For n = 0 ∼ N − 1 and i = 0 ∼ 7,
p′n,i =
{
pn,i, if wk = 1,
pn,i, otherwise,
(3)
where k = 8n+ i, x = (x⊕ 1).
Proof To proof the theorem, we study the four possible
combination of (wk, pn,i) as follows.
– (wk, pn,i) = (1, 1):
p′n,i = f(pn,i · wk + ck · w˜k − θk)
= f(1 + (−1/2) · w˜k − θk)
=
{
f(1− 1/2− 0), if w˜k = 1,
f(1 + 1/2− 1), otherwise
= f(1/2)
= 1.
– (wk, pn,i) = (1, 0):
p′n,i = f(pn,i · wk + ck · w˜k − θk)
= f(0 + (−1/2) · w˜k − θk)
=
{
f(0− 1/2− 0), if w˜k = 1,
f(0 + 1/2− 1), otherwise
= f(−1/2)
= 0.
– (wk, pn,i) = (−1, 1):
p′n,i = f(pn,i · wk − ck · w˜k + θk)
= f(−1− 1/2 · w˜k + θk)
=
{
f(−1− 1/2 + 1), if w˜k = 1,
f(−1 + 1/2 + 0), otherwise
= f(−1/2)
= 0.
– (wk, pn,i) = (−1, 0):
p′n,i = f(pn,i · wk − ck · w˜k + θk)
= f(0− 1/2 · w˜k + θk)
=
{
f(0− 1/2 + 1), if w˜k = 1,
f(0 + 1/2 + 0), otherwise
= f(1/2)
= 1.
Combining the above four cases, one has
p′n,i =

1, if pn,i = 1 and wk = 1,
0, if pn,i = 0 and wk = 1,
0, if pn,i = 1 and wk = −1,
1, if pn,i = 0 and wk = −1,
which means
p′n,i =
{
pn,i, if wk = 1,
pn,i, otherwise,
Thus, the theorem is proved. ⊓⊔
Observe Theorem 1, one has
p′n,i = pn,i ⊕ w
′
k, (4)
where w′k = (wk + 1)/2. From Eq. (4), one can get
(pn ⊕ p
′
n) = ηn,
where ηn =
∑7
i=0 w
′
8n+i ·2
i and n = 0 ∼ N−1. For any
another cipher-imageQ′ = {q′n}
N−1
n=0 encrypted with the
same secret key, one can easily reveal the corresponding
plain-image Q = {qn}
N−1
n=0 by calculating
qn = q
′
n ⊕ ηn
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for n = 0 ∼ N − 1, which means H = {ηn}
N−1
n=0 can
work as equivalent secret key.
To verify performance of the above attack, some
experiments were made. Figure 1 shows a plain-image
“Lenna” of size 512×512 and the encryption result with
the secret key (x∗0, y
∗
0 , z
∗
0) = (1, 1, 0), and h = 10
−1.
A mask image H is constructed by XORing datum
of Fig. 1a) and Fig. 1b) byte by byte, and shown in
Fig. 2a). The mask image is then used to decrypt an-
other cipher-image shown in Fig. 2b) and the result is
shown in Fig. 2c), which is identical with the original
plain-image “Baboon”.
a) b)
Fig. 1 One known plain-image and the corresponding cipher-
image: a) known plain-image “Lenna”, b) cipher-image of
Fig. 1a).
a)
b) c)
Fig. 2 Known-plaintext attack: a) the mask image H, b)
cipher-image of plain-image “Baboon”, c) the recovered im-
age of Fig. 2b).
3.2 Some other security defects
In this subsection, we further report some other security
defects of the image encryption algorithm under study.
– Low sensitivity with respect to change of plain-image
If encryption results of an encryption algorithm are
not sensitive to change of plaintext in a significant
degree, the attacker can make predictions about the
plaintext from the given ciphertext only. The de-
sirable property of encryption algorithm is called
avalanche effect in field of cryptography. The prop-
erty is even more important for image encryption
algorithms since image datum and its watermarked
versions, generally slight modified versions of the
original ones, are encrypted often at the same time
and stored at the same place. The avalanche effect
is quantitatively measured by how every bit of ci-
phertext is changed when only one bit of plaintext
is modified. As for the image encryption algorithm
under study, change of one bit of plain-image can
only influent one bit of the same location in the
corresponding ciphertext, which disobeys expected
property of a secure encryption algorithm very far.
– Insufficient randomness of the two used PRBSs
The complex dynamical properties of chaos systems
demonstrated in continuous domain make they are
considered as good generation source of PRBS. How-
ever, chaos systems can not do the expected things
in general since their dynamical properties will def-
initely degenerate in digital domain, where every-
thing is stored and calculated in limited precision
[12]. In addition, some chaos systems need numeri-
cal approximation, the used simulation methods and
related parameters will have different influences on
degradation of the dynamical properties of the chaos
system also. As for the image encryption algorithm
under study, trajectory of Lorenz system is contin-
uous, which means that any two consecutive simu-
lated states are always correlated in a high degree.
As a consequence, the bits derived from neighboring
states will also be correlated closely. Furthermore,
the smaller the step length h is, the stronger the
correlation will be [9]. Meanwhile, the value of h
should be small enough since the accumulated error
of the fourth-order Runge-Kutta method is O(h4).
So, step length h should not be used as a sub-key
since its valid scope can not be defined clearly. To
verify this point, we employed the NIST statistical
test suite [16] to test the randomness of 100 binary
sequences of length 512× 512× 8 = 2, 097, 152 bits
(the number of bits in {w′k} used for the encryption
of 512×512 gray-scale images). Note that the 100 bi-
nary sequences are generated by randomly selected
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initial conditions (x∗0, y
∗
0 , z
∗
0) and a given step length
h. For each test, the default significance level 0.01
was adopted. The passing rates in terms of binary
matrix rank test, calculating the rank of disjoint
sub-matrices of the entire sequence, under different
values of step length h are shown in Fig. 3, which
agree with the estimation. We found that the PRBSs
generated by the method used in the image encryp-
tion algorithm under study can not pass most tests
in the test suite even for the step length h under
which the rank test can be passed. When h = 0.1,
the test results are shown in Table 1, from which one
can see that the used pseudo-random bit generator
is not a good source of PRBS.
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0
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Fig. 3 Passing rate of the rank test under different values of
step length h.
Table 1 The performed tests with respect to a significance
level 0.01 and the number of sequences passing each test in
100 randomly generated sequences.
Name of Test Number of Passed Sequences
Frequency 93
Block Frequency (m = 128) 100
Cumulative Sums-Forward 94
Runs 0
Rank 100
Serial (m = 16) 0
Spectral Test 0
Random Excursions(x=1) 0
Approximate Entropy (m =
10)
0
Longest Runs of Ones
(m=10000)
0
Non-overlapping Template
(m = 9, B = 000000001)
0
4 Conclusion
In this paper, the security of a chaotic image encryption
algorithm based on perceptron model has been investi-
gated in detail. The seeming complex encryption algo-
rithm was proved to be equivalent to a stream cipher
essentially, and so it can be broken with only one pair
of known-plaintext/ciphretext. In addition, some other
security defects of the encryption algorithm, including
insensitivity with respect to change of plain-image and
low randomness of PRBS used are also reported. In all,
this cryptanalysis paper shows us again that security of
an encryption algorithm should be mainly built on good
essential structure of the whole encryption operations
instead of so-called complex theories.
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